Religion and the individual: a socio-legal perspective by Sandberg, Russell
Pre-print version of a book chapter accepted for publication by Routledge in Day, A. ed. Religion and the 
Individual: Belief, Practice, and Identity.  Aldershot:  Ashgate, pp. 157-168. 
 
1 
Religion and the Individual: A Socio-Legal Perspective 
 
 
Russell Sandberg  
 
 
The question of whether and how religion ought to be defined has long engaged both 
academics and lawyers (See, for example, the volumes edited by Idinopulos and Wilson 
(1998) and Platvoet and Molendijk (1999)).  Weber and Durkheim put forward 
contrasting views as to the usefulness of a definition of ‘religion’.  Whilst Weber 
contended that “definition can be attempted, if at all, only at the conclusion of the study” 
(1965), Durkheim argued that a preliminary definition was required in order to “avoid 
focussing by mistake on ideas and practices that are not religious or conversely 
overlooking genuinely religious phenomena (2001, 25).1   Durkheim’s rationale for a 
preliminary definition is as persuasive for the practicing lawyer as it is for the scholar 
(Sandberg, 2006b, forthcoming).  In both cases, a definition serves as a basis of inclusion 
and exclusion.  Certain groups are not studied by the scholar or denied legal protection on 
the grounds that they are not ‘religions’.   
 
Furthermore, the preliminary definition outlined by Durkheim in The Elementary Forms 
of Religious Life may be of use to lawyers in that the juxtaposition of legal texts with 
Durkheim’s definition may reveal the often implicit presumptions and prejudices present 
in the law.  Laws employ various definitions and conceptions of ‘religion’ which often 
contradict each other, even within the same jurisdiction.  Studying State law in this way 
enables a greater understanding of the perception of ‘religion’ held by the State whilst 
studying religious law (the rules and regulatory instruments of religious groups) in this 
manner may reveal an insight into how those groups perceive themselves, their own 
identity and their relationship with other religious groups and the State.  This piece 
focuses upon one definitional attribute of a ‘religion’ identified by Durkheim in The 
Elementary Forms of Religious Life: namely his assertion that religion is “eminently 
collective” (2002, 46).  After elucidating the importance of this requirement to 
Durkheim’s definition of religion, this piece examines whether State laws support 
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Durkheim’s claim, refute it or suggest a different understanding.  This examination will 
begin with the most important State laws on religion: human rights guarantees common 
to many jurisdictions and constitutional provisions unique to specific jurisdictions.  This 
will be followed by a discussion of particular laws in England and Wales.   This legal 
evidence provides a previously unexplored dimension of the sociological debate since 
Durkheim: namely, whether is religion now largely a public or private affair (Hill, 1973, 
James, 1982).  Furthermore, what follows will constitute an exploratory examination of 
how sociological works, such as those of Durkheim, may enable a greater understanding 
of legal texts on religion (Doe, 2004; this is developed further in Sandberg, forthcoming).   
 
As is well known, in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Durkheim defined a 
‘religion’ as “a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to 
say, things set apart and surrounded by prohibitions – beliefs and practices that unites its 
adherents in a single moral community called a church” (2001, 46).  Durkheim thus puts 
forward a two stage definition.  The first stage is that there needs to be “beliefs and 
practices relative to sacred things”.  However, this is not sufficient.  As Durkheim noted, 
the definition is “not yet complete since it applies equally to two orders of things which, 
though related, must none the less be distinguished: magic and religion” (2002, 41).  For 
Durkheim, a distinction between ‘magic’ and ‘religion’ must be made given the 
“hostility” between the two (2002, 42).2  Durkheim contends that such a distinction can 
be made by stressing the collective nature of religion (2002, 42).  This constitutes the 
second stage of Durkheim’s definition: a religion is something “eminently collective” 
(2002, 46). 
 
For Durkheim, the collective nature of ‘religion’ was a central definitional attribute.  He 
contended that historically ‘religion’ had not existed without what he called a ‘church’, 
meaning simply a “society whose members are united together because they share a 
common conception of the sacred world and its relation to the profane world, and who 
translate this common conception into identical practices” (2002, 42-43).  For Durkheim, 
a church does not require “any official governing body” but is rather simply “a defined 
group” (2002, 43).3  The presence of a church can distinguish religion from mere magic 
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since a “church of magic does not exist”:  “magic does not bind its followers to one 
another and unite them in a single group living the same life”; there are “no lasting 
bonds” between the magician and their followers that “make them members of a moral 
body”. (2002, 42-43).    Durkheim conceded that his definition precludes individual 
religiosity.  Writing in 1912, he noted that some of his contemporaries had wondered 
whether “individual religions established by the individual and celebrated for himself 
alone” were “likely to become the dominant form of religious life” but asked the reader to 
“leave aside these speculations on the future” and to focus upon “religions as they are in 
the present and as they have been in the past”. (2002, 44-45).  However, he did comment 
that such individual cults did not constitute a different type of religion but “rather the 
same ideas and the same principles” applied to a different circumstances, focussed on 
“the life of the individual” rather than the “collectivity as a whole” (2002, 45). 
 
Almost a century has passed since Durkheim formulated his definition of religion.  It is a 
subject of intense debate whether religion is still by definition a collective activity or 
whether it is now a private individual affair.  However, reference to law is non-existent in 
this debate (Hill, 1973, James, 1982).  The purpose of the present piece is to examine 
whether the legal evidence supports Durkheim’s assertion that religion is “eminently 
collective” (2002, 46), beginning with international human rights guarantees.  As Edge 
(2002, 29) notes, throughout the twentieth century, international law evolved beyond the 
nineteenth century focus on the relationship between States to the elucidation and 
protection of international human rights guarantees, which invariably included provisions 
on religion of various different kinds (see Little, 2002, 35).  Of these provisions, Article 
18 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 1948 (UDHR) may be seen as a 
“watershed” in that it was the first international treaty which did not conceptualise 
religion under the umbrella of minority rights (Evans, 1997, 172-173).  Rather, religion 
was protected as a general human right.  The Article provides:  
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change 
his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.  
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For Evans, under Article 18, freedom of religion became “bound up with the 
development of the concept of individual human rights as an object of international legal 
concern” (1997, 172-173).  There are two separate rights under Article 18.  The first right 
is the internal freedom of freedom of thought, conscience and religion – known as the 
forum internum – this includes the right to hold a religion or belief and to change it.  
Martínez-Torrón (2002, 104) contends that like other human rights, this internal freedom 
is “primarily an individual right”. The second right is the external freedom to manifest 
religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance – known as the  
forum externum – this may take place “either alone or in community with others and in 
public or private”.  This appears to be recognition of a collective right to religious liberty. 
However, it can be argued that all this affects is the exercise of the rights: the right to 
manifest is an individual right which may be exercised individually (“alone”) or 
collectively (“in community with others”).  The Article simply recognises the choice of 
the individual; it does not recognise a collective right to religious liberty as such.   
 
This perception of religion as primarily an individual matter has been further elucidated 
in relation to Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  Article 9(1) is 
almost identical to Article 18 UDHR.4  Evans (2001, 72) contends that Article 9(1) is an 
individual right since “the emphasis in the interpretation of Article 9 is on the internal: 
the private thought, conscience and religion of the individual”.  It does not provide a 
collective right for religious groups acting as such to manifest their religious liberty (see 
Evans, 2001, 103).  However, despite this, the European Court of Human Rights has 
heard cases brought by religious groups.  For Taylor (2005, 225-226), this does not 
indicate that Article 9 includes a collective right; rather when such cases are brought it is 
actually the individual members who are exercising their individual rights collectively. 
The European Commission for Human Rights has held that Churches are entitled to 
protection under Article 9 but only through the protection afforded to its individual 
members, and based upon their either identical or at least substantially similar views.5 
Collective religiosity is only protected to facilitate the individual’s manifestation of 
religion.6  Although Martínez-Torrón (2002, 14) has concluded that this means that 
Article 9 also has “a very significant institutional or ‘collective’ dimension”, it is difficult 
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to reconcile this view with the jurisprudence of the international bodies. The way in 
which Article 9 is framed – as an individual right that which may be exercised with 
others – means that any collective dimension derives from the individual right.7  
 
 
Other human rights provisions follow this interpretation of Article 9 ECHR and Article 
18 UDHR.  The text of Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) is similar to Article 9; Evans (2000, 46) contends that it “permits 
individuals to act in a fashion which is in accordance with their beliefs if it is linked to a 
form of worship, teaching or observance”.8  However, the Human Rights Committee in 
1993 commented that “a broad range of acts” were protected by the Article: the reference 
to “practice” and “teaching” includes “acts integral to the conduct by religious groups of 
their basic affairs, such as, inter alia, the freedom to choose their own religious leaders, 
priests and teachers, the freedom to establish seminaries or religious schools and the 
freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts and publications”.9  This suggests that 
certain collective rights originate from the individual right on the face of the Article.  
This is also true of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and 
Discrimination based on Religion or Belief 1981.  Article 1 of the sets out freedom of 
religion in terms very similar to the Universal Declaration and International Covenant but 
Article 6, in providing a list of freedoms that are included in this general right, outlines a 
number of derivative rights which benefit collective religiosity.  Under Article 6, freedom 
of religion includes the right to “worship or assemble in connection with a religion or 
belief, and to establish and maintain places for these purposes”, to “establish and 
maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian institutions” and to “establish and 
maintain communications with individuals and communities in matters of religion and 
belief at the national and international levels.”  However, it is clear that these collective 
rights derive from the individual rights.  
 
Freedom of religion provisions in international human rights treaties invariably 
influences the corresponding provisions in national constitutions.  For example, in  
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Finland, section 11 of the 2000 Constitution, which protects freedom of religion, is 
clearly focussed on the individual bestowing upon individual citizens a number of 
individual rights and freedoms.10 However, the Constitutions of Spain and Italy, for 
example, protect freedom of religion as both an individual and a collective right. Article 
16 of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 proclaims that, “Freedom of ideology, religion 
and worship of individuals and communities is guaranteed, with no other restriction on 
their expression than may be necessary to maintain public order as protected by law”.  
The Italian Constitution 1948 protects individual religious freedom under Article 19 
(which bestows upon every citizen the right to “profess faith freely” and to “exercise 
worship in public or private, provided that the rites involved do not offend common 
decency”) and collective religious freedom under Articles 7 and 8.11 
 
This is also the position with regard to constitutional law in England and Wales.  By 
virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998, the individual right to religious liberty found in 
Article 9 ECHR is now part of English law.  However, due to lobbying by religious 
groups during the passage of the Human Rights Bill through Parliament (see Edge, 2002, 
85), the Human Rights Act 1998 also includes a special provision recognising the 
Convention rights of religious organizations under section 13.  Section 13 serves as a 
“specific recognition of religious group autonomy” (Ahdar and Leigh, 2005, 327); it 
involves only collective, and not individual, religious liberty (Rivers, 2000, 138).  It 
reads:  
(1) If a court’s determination of any question arising under this Act might affect the exercise by a religious 
organisation (itself or its members collectively) of the Convention right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion, it must have particular regard to the importance of that right. 
 (2) In this section ‘court’ includes a tribunal. 
Section 13 seems to recognise a collective right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion, which courts should have “particular regard” for.  However, commentators seem 
divided as to the significance of the section.  For Rivers (2001, 227), the section means 
that an “interesting collective religious liberty will prevail” over competing interests but 
Cumper (2000) contends that section 13 is merely a symbolic political statement designed 
to placate religious opponents.  Judicial decisions to date suggest that Ahdar and Leigh 
(2005, 359) may be accurate in calling the provision “rather mild”.  Section 13 aside, 
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there are other examples of how English constitutional law may regard religion as a 
collective right.  By dint of the established status of the Church of England (for details, 
see Doe, 1996, Hill, 2001 and Sandberg, 2006a), certain rights are enjoyed by virtue of 
being resident in a Church of England parish.  In the words of Say (1991), “every citizen 
resident in the parish has, regardless of their own religious commitment or lack of it, a 
rightful claim upon their parish priest”.  This extends to a broad right to attend public 
worship,12  to receive Holy Communion unless there is a lawful excuse for denial,13 and 
to be married and buried in the Parish Church.14  It is unclear whether such rights are 
individual rights attached to individual parishioners or collective rights in that they arise 
by virtue of collective residence in a parish.  It is clearer that the exercise of these rights 
is collective: the resulting rites are all exercised in groups.  The fact that English law 
effectively provides for public access to these rites infers that it sees religion, at least in 
the guise of the established church, as something that is exercised collectively.   
 
Such collective rights are common in countries where there is a State Church.  For 
example, Article 4 of the Danish Constitution of 1849, as amended in 1953, states that 
“The Evangelical Lutheran Church shall be the Folk Church of Denmark, and as such 
shall be supported by the State”.   This provides a collective right to the Church for 
special treatment.  Moreover, in some jurisdictions, the constitution may favour the State 
Church by imposing a collective burden upon members.  An example of this may be 
found in section 7 of the Church of Sweden Act 1998, which states that, “Members of the 
Church of Sweden shall pay a local and a regional church fee”.  Such provisions clearly 
indicate a perception that religion is a collective phenomenon: the collective practice of 
religion is recognised by the State and the State imposes upon members a duty to finance 
it.   By contrast, other constitutions reveal a view that freedom of religion is neither a 
collective nor an individual right.   Article 13 of the Greek Constitution, states that, 
“Freedom of religious conscience is inviolable. The enjoyment of civil rights and liberties 
does not depend on the individual’s religious beliefs”.   This infers that the right is not 
directed to religious believers as individuals or religious groups as collectives; rather, the 
right is free-standing and simply exists.   
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The recent history of the Irish Constitution shows a move from a collective right to a 
right which although individual in part is actually directed not at human individuals or 
collectives but rather at the divine.  Article 44 of the 1937 Constitution formerly provided 
a collective right in that it provided that “the state recognises the special position of the 
Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church as the guardian of the Faith professed by the 
great majority of citizens”.  However, Article 44(2) now provides an individual right, 
stating that “Freedom of conscience and the free profession and practice of religion are, 
subject to public order and morality, guaranteed to every citizen”.  This is preceded by 
Article 44(1) which casts freedom of religion not as a human right but rather as homage 
to God, providing, “The State acknowledges that the homage of public worship is due to 
Almighty God. It shall hold His Name in reverence, and shall respect and honour 
religion”.   Although the Constitutional Review Group in 1996 called for Article 44.1 to 
be replaced by the phrase “The State guarantees to respect religion”, this has not been put 
to the people (Colton 2006: p.97).  If the change was implemented, it would be uncertain 
whether the phrase “The State guarantees to respect religion” sees ‘religion’ as a 
collective phenomena, a private affair or as a duty to the divine.  
 
Expanding the focus away from the key constitutional instruments reveal numerous ways 
in which laws see religion as both an individual and a collective affair.   Laws from 
England and Wales may serve as an example.  There are a number of laws in England 
and Wales which extend legal to protection to religious groups.  On the surface these 
laws suggest a perception of religion as a collective activity.  An obvious example would 
be laws which provide special treatment for religious groups and organisations.   Legal 
preference is awarded to the collective manifestation of religion.  There are a number of 
criminal offences which outlaw hostility or hatred towards religious groups.  A crime is 
“racially or religiously aggravated” (and consequentially punished by a tougher sentence) 
where there is “hostility towards members of a racial or religious group based on their 
membership of that group”.15  A defendant is guilty of an offence under the Racial and 
Religious Hated Act 2006 if he stirs up “hatred against a group of persons defined by 
reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief”.16 In both cases, the criminal law 
only protects religious individuals if they are members of a collective.  A further example 
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can be found in the exemptions religious groups enjoy from discrimination law.  For 
example, under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, it is illegal to discriminate on grounds 
of sex.  However, “organised religions” have an exemption under section 19: they may 
lawfully require employees to be of a particular sex, for example, if that requirement is 
imposed “so as to comply with the doctrines of the religion”, or “because of the nature of 
the employment and the context in which it is carried out, so as to avoid conflicting with 
the strongly-held religious convictions of a significant number of the religion's 
followers”.  This is clearly a collective right; although if it is exercised for the second 
reason, it is a collective right exercised on behalf of a “significant number” of individuals 
who belong to the collective.17 
A further example of how the law recognises religion as a collective force can be found 
in the preferential legal treatment for places of worship.18   Such privileges for places of 
worship cannot be read as rights for individual members or for individual citizens since 
the preferential treatment of such buildings does not give rise to an individual right to use 
such buildings as places or worship or as buildings of historical or architectural interest.19 
However, the legal protection of worship does not infer a perception that religion is a 
collective force since English law does not distinguish between collective or individual 
worship;20 the House of Lords has recognised that worship may be communal or 
personal.21  A final example of legal protection of religion as collective phenomenon may 
be found in legal statements that underline the perceived societal benefits of religion. 
However, although they seem to suggest the collective nature of religion by emphasizing 
the public benefit of religion,22 this is not necessarily evidence that the courts see religion 
as a collective phenomenon since courts have stressed that the public benefit derives from 
the fact that it beneficial for individuals to have a religion.23  Although the black letter of 
the law seems to be recognising the collective nature of religion, a closer examination 
shows that it is simply the recognition of the individual right to religious liberty 
expressed in close association.    
 
In addition to these laws, which seem to protect religious groups, there are also numerous 
laws in England and Wales which protect religious believers and seem to infer that 
Pre-print version of a book chapter accepted for publication by Routledge in Day, A. ed. Religion and the 
Individual: Belief, Practice, and Identity.  Aldershot:  Ashgate, pp. 157-168. 
 
10 
religion is an individual matter.  Indeed, a recent House of Lords decision explicitly 
characterised religion as an individual matter.  For Lord Nicholls: 
Religious and other beliefs and convictions are part of the humanity of every individual. They are an integral 
part of his personality and individuality.24 
English law mirrors this understanding of religion by providing free-standing legal rights 
for believers, epitomised by the ‘conscience clause’ which exempts the individual from a 
generally applicable law on grounds of their conscientious objection.25  Other legal rights 
are bestowed upon the individual on grounds of their ‘religion’. For example, section 1 of 
the Adoption and Children Act 2002, in common with various other statutes regarding the 
care of children, recognises the right of children to have “due consideration” to be given 
to their “religious persuasion”.   A further example is section 139 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1988, which provides that it is a defence to carry an article with a blade “for religious 
reasons”.  This provision provides for the exemption of the Sikh Kirpan but is drafted 
broadly so that the exemption is not dependent upon membership of the collective but is 
an individual right.  Other legal rights are bestowed upon the individual on grounds of 
‘religion’ such as those provided by the Human Rights Act 1998 and the new law on 
religious discrimination.26  Such rights are not dependent upon individuals being a 
member of a particular collective but are dependent on individuals being aligned with a 
religion.  It might be suspected that those who are part of a collective will find this 
requirement easier to meet.  Indeed, if the State’s conception of religion is narrowly 
defined so that only known collective religions are protected, then these rights, though 
addressed to the individual, become collective rights.  
 
Indeed, a number of seemingly individual rights are actually collective rights since they 
are only bestowed upon individuals by virtue of their membership of a collective.  For 
example, although Sikhs working on a building site are exempt from the normal rule 
requiring the wearing of safety hats, this right is not an individual right since the 
exemption in section 11 of the Employment Act 1989 cannot be relied upon by those who 
are not members of the Sikh faith.  Exemptions from normal slaughter rules to permit 
religious methods are also rights dependent upon membership of the collective: they only 
apply to licensed Muslims or Jews who use Jewish or Muslim methods for the food of 
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Jews or Muslims.27 However, where a right is conferred only upon those who are not 
members of a religious collective, such a right is clearly an individual right since those 
who are granted the right are not members of a collective and are defined by their lack of 
membership. A rare example of such a right may be found in section 1 of the Oaths Act 
1978 which provides that anyone who is “neither a Christian nor a Jew” does not have to 
take the oath in the prescribed form provided that they take it “in any lawful manner”.   
 
It is clear that the legal evidence represents a recognition that religion is both an 
individual and collective phenomenon.   Although human rights instruments are phrased 
as individual rights and are directed at individuals, they have some effect upon religious 
collectives.  Furthermore, although international human rights guarantees colour 
provisions on religion in national constitutions, many such constitutions stress the 
collective rights of religious organisations.  This is true in not only in countries where 
there is a State Church such as England and Denmark but is also in other jurisdictions, 
such as Spain and Italy.  Laws in England and Wales which defend religious groups and 
religious believers indicate that religion is protected both as a collective activity and as a 
key element of personal identity.  Legal provisions seemingly protecting religious groups 
often have the purpose of protecting the individuals who make up such groups.  
Provisions which seem to protect the individual are often dependent on that individual 
being a member of a collective or designated as religious in some other way.  This lack of 
a clear distinction between individual and collective rights may be interpreted as showing 
that Durkheim was correct.  Collectivity remains a definitional attribute of religion: the 
law has not fully embraced the idea that religion is an individual and private affair. 
Moreover, the legal evidence supports the Durkheimian premise that individual cults do 
not constitute a different type of religion: the legal evidence suggests an understanding of 
religion as a phenomenon which has both a collective and an individual dimension.  More 
broadly, this exploratory examination serves as a case study to illustrate how the study of 
law and legal mechanisms may enrich a sociological understanding of religion (Doe, 
2004, Sandberg, forthcoming). 
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1 However, the difference between Weber and Durkheim should not be over-stated.  Durkheim recognised 
that such a preliminary definition would be limited.  He noted that “the underlying and truly revealing 
features of religion” can only be determined “at the end of our inquiry”. 
  
2 “Magic takes a kind of professional pleasure in profaning holy things” and that although “religion has not 
always condemned and prohibited magical rites, it generally views them with disfavour” (2002, 42). 
 
3 This is questionable: who defines the group?  Surely the group is defined by some official body, whether 
itself or the State.  
 
Pre-print version of a book chapter accepted for publication by Routledge in Day, A. ed. Religion and the 
Individual: Belief, Practice, and Identity.  Aldershot:  Ashgate, pp. 157-168. 
 
14 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 It provides: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.” 
 
5 X v Denmark (1976) 5 ECHR 157 See also X and the Church of Scientology v Sweden (1979) 16 D&R 68.  
 
6 Thus, denying legal recognition entirely to certain religious groups has been held to violate freedom of 
religion (Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v Moldova (2002) 35 EHRR 306). 
 
7 Article 9(2) does provide a collective right but this is a collective right for the State to limit the 
individual’s right to manifest if prescribed conditions are met.   It reads: “Freedom to manifest one’s 
religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 
 
8 Emphasis added.  
 
9 Human Rights Committee General Comment 22 of 1993, para 4 
 
10 It provides: “Everyone has the freedom of religion and conscience.  Freedom of religion and conscience 
entails the right to profess and practice a religion, the right to express one’s convictions and the right to be a 
member of or decline to be a member of a religious community. No one is under the obligation, against his 
or her conscience, to participate in the practice of a religion.” 
 
11 Article 7 is concerned with the Catholic Church, providing that, “The State and the Catholic Church are, 
each according to its own order, independent and sovereign”.  Article 8 is concerned with all religious 
groups other providing that “all denominations are equally free before the law” and that such 
denominations have the right to organise themselves provided that they do not conflict with the Italian legal 
system.    
 
12 Cole v PC [1937] 1KB 316 
 
13 Sacrament Act 1547, section 8 
 
14 Argar v Holdsworth (1758) 2 Lee 515; Kemp v Wickes (1809) 3 Phil Ecc 26; Burial Law Amendments 
Act 1880 
 
15 Section 28 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 as amended by the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act 2001.  Note that this only applies to certain crimes: see sections 29-32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 
1998. 
 
16 The Act creates six new offences.  To be charged with any offence, the words, behaviour, written 
material or recordings or programme must be threatening, and there must be an intention to stir up religious 
hatred: see Hare (2006) 
 
17 Other exceptions for religious groups are provided by laws outlawing discrimination on grounds of 
religion or belief. In the context of employment, there is an exemption where being of a particular religion 
or belief is “a genuine occupational requirement for the job” and that ‘it is proportionate to apply that 
requirement in the particular case” (Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, regulation 
7(3)).  In the context of goods and services, there are broad exemption for organisations “relating to 
religion or belief”, religious charities and faith schools (Equality Act 2006, sections 57-59). 
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18 For example, section 60 of the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 provides an 
exemption for “any ecclesiastical buildings which is for the time being used for ecclesiastical purposes”.  
Further examples include the Ecclesiastical Exemption (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Order 
1994 (SI 1994/1771) and section 11 of the Local Government Finance Act 1988. 
 
19 Cole v Police Constable 443A[1937] 1 KB 316 
 
20 See the leading case of R v Registrar General, ex parte Segerdal [1970] 3 All ER 886.  For Lord Denning 
MR, “Religious worship means reverence or veneration of God or of a supreme being” whilst Buckley LJ 
defined worship as “something which must have some, at least, of the following characteristics: submission 
to the object worshipped, veneration of that object, praise, thanksgiving, prayer or intercession”.  
 
21 See the comments of Lord Nicholls in R v Secretary of State for Education ex parte Williamson [2005] 
UKHL 15: “To a greater or lesser extent adherents are required or encouraged to act in certain ways, most 
obviously and directly in forms of communal or personal worship, supplication and meditation”. 
 
22 To be recognised as charity ‘for the advancement of religion’, the purpose must have a public benefit.  
Historically, it has been presumed that all religious charities have a public benefit.  However, under the 
Charities Act 2006, religions must prove this.  It has been suggested that most religious charities will have 
no difficulty doing so.   See, for example, the comments of Edward Miliband at second reading in the 
House of Commons on the 26th June 2006: “making provision for people to attend acts of worship is clearly 
a public benefit.” This has been recognized by the courts:  in Neville Estates v Madden [1962] Ch 832, 
Cross J noted that courts was “entitled to assume that some benefit accrues to the public from the 
attendance at places of worship of persons who live in this world and mix with their fellow citizens”.  
 
23 This ‘bottom-up’ approach can be found in the words of Lord Simmonds in Gilmour v Coates [1949] AC 
426: “The law of England … assumes that it is good for man to have and to practise a religion.” 
 
24 R v Secretary of State for Education ex parte Williamson [2005] UKHL 15 
 
25 See, for example, section 4 of the Abortion Act 1967: “no person shall be under any duty, whether by 
contract or by any statutory or other legal requirement, to participate in any treatment authorised by this Act 
to which he has a conscientious objection”.  
 
26 Under the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 and part 2 of the Equality Act 
2006, it is unlawful for A to discriminate against B on grounds of religion or belief, for example.  
Developments in discrimination law and human rights law are discussed by Hill and Sandberg (2006) 
 
27 Welfare of Animals (Slaughter or Killing) Regulations 1995  
